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HOW TO LOOK A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH-
DISCLAIMERS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW AND
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
INTRODUCTION
Every lawyer who writes or probates wills is familiar with
disclaimers.' They are an effective estate planning tool which
serve to minimize taxes, especially at the federal level.2 The
failure to use them when appropriate may amount to legal
malpractice.3 Though this would seem to imply some certainty
in regard to their use, the law of disclaimers has been changing
rapidly in the last few years. This rapidly changing law has left
many traps for the unwary, which periodic legislative efforts
have attempted to solve.
The 1972 California statute on disclaimers represented one
such legislative attempt.' Prior to 1977, state law determined
the effectiveness of a disclaimer for federal tax purposes. Con-
sequently, the statute's clarification of such problems as what
types of interests were disclaimable,5 the form of a disclaimer,'
the time period for making one,7 and the effect of a disclaimer
on the devolution of property,' marked a major step forward.
More recently, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 emerged as the
1. A disclaimer is basically the refusal to accept a gift conferred either inter vivos
or by will. Newman, Substantive and Tax Aspects of Disclaimers and Renunciations,
7 INST. EST. PLAN. 73.500 (1973).
2. Id.
3. See Lecture by Prof. Jerry Kasner at Univ. of Santa Clara School of Law (Fall
1976).
4. See CAL. PaOB. CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1977).
5. See CAL. PROS. CODE § 190(a) (West Supp. 1977). The types of interests which
are potentially disclaimable include interests acquired through intestate succession, by
will, by gift, and through survivorship in a joint tenancy. The common law prohibited
disclaiming an interest acquired though intestate succession because an heir could not
prevent passage of title to himself. There has also been controversy over whether a
partial disclaimer (one in which part of the interest was disclaimed and part was
accepted) is valid. See Newman & Kalter, The Need for Disclaimer Legislation-An
Analysis of the Background and Current Law, 28 TAx LAW. 571, 586, 580 (1975).
6. For the form of an effective disclaimer, see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 190(c), 190.1,
190.4 (West Supp. 1977). The Code also settles the issue as to the survivorship of the
right to disclaim by allowing a disclaimer by the personal representative of a decedent.
Id. § 190.2.
7. See id. § 190.3. The issue of the proper time within which to make a valid
disclaimer has caused more problems in the area of disclaimers than any other issue.
8. See id. § 190.6. Under common law the effect of a disclaimer was to treat the
transfer as if it had never been made. The recent trend has been to analogize the
disclaimer to a lapsed legacy in which the beneficiary predeceases the donor. Either
theory usually results in the interest passing through the residuary estate. There is a
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federal solution to the problems surrounding the use of dis-
claimers.' It specified certain requirements for an effective dis-
claimer for federal tax purposes which appear to be more lim-
ited than the California statute. However, it does not deal with
many aspects of disclaimers, which presumably should be gov-
erned by state law.
This comment will begin by outlining the possible advan-
tageous uses of disclaimers for state and federal estate planning
purposes. Following this outline, it will examine the federal law
on disclaimers before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, state law as
exemplified by the California statute, and the federal law
under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, to point out the potential
problem areas regarding the use of disclaimers. Finally, it will
indicate various aspects of these problem areas which need to
be clarified or corrected.
ADVANTAGES OF USING DISCLAIMERS
Although disclaimers may have some value in the area of
inter vivos gifts their basic use is in the area of post-mortem
estate planning.10 They may be needed because there was no
pre-death planning, or if there was, because that planning was
inadequate or obsolete due to changes in circumstances in the
federal or state law. Increasingly, they are used in good pre-
death estate planning to provide certain post-mortem elections
which will still result in the passage of property according to
the testator's intent. In either instance, the proper use of dis-
claimers can result in considerable federal or state gift, estate,
income, and inheritance tax savings."
Gift Tax
In a situation where a disclaimer results in the passing of
an interest to a beneficiary to whom the disclaimant otherwise
wishes to make a gift of the interest, there is a potential gift
tax savings. This transaction is treated as if the disclaimant
never received the interest rather than as a taxable transfer of
possibility that it will pass by intestate succession, however, if there is no residuary
clause or if the anti-lapse clause does not reach the interest under the common law
theory. See Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 592.
9. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
10. Johnson, Disclaimers as an Estate Planning Tool, 19 PRAC. LAW. No. 8, at




that interest to the second beneficiary. 2 For example, suppose
John receives a bequest under a will which will go to his daugh-
ter Mary if he doesn't take the interest. If he would like to gift
the bequest to her anyway, he may simply disclaim the interest
which will then pass to Mary. By disclaiming, John avoids the
gift tax he would have incurred had he accepted the gift and
then given it to Mary. Thus, as was stated in a California
case,' 3 the right to disclaim is essentially the same as a general
power of appointment without any of the incidents of taxation
that go along with the exercise of such a power."
Estate Tax
If the effect of the disclaimer is essentially the same as the
estate planning desires of the disclaimant and he has no use for
the property, a disclaimer can potentially result in saving es-
tate taxes upon his death since the disclaimed property will not
pass through his estate. In the previous example, if John in-
tends to will his bequest to Mary anyway and he doesn't want
or need it, he may disclaim the interest, and again it will pass
directly to Mary. This disclaimer would save his estate the
estate tax it would have to pay on the interest had he held it
at his death.
Additionally, disclaimers can play a key role in the advan-
tageous use of several specific statutory provisions, resulting in
estate tax savings to either the estate making the bequest or
the one disclaiming it.
The marital deduction. There is a potential for increasing
the estate tax marital deduction by disclaiming interests which
will then pass to a spouse and qualify for the deduction. 5 For
12. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 15209 (West
Supp. 1977).
13. In re Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 108 P.2d 401, 403 (1940).
14. A general power of appointment gives the holder of the power the right to
exercise the power over the property involved in favor of anyone he may select includ-
ing himself. The analogy is not quite correct since a person disclaiming an interest
doesn't get to choose who will receive the disclaimed interest. However, it is true that
the interest passes to another by the non-taxable actions of the disclaimant. See
generally H. HARRIS, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE ch. 8 (1971).
The exercise of a general power of appointment results in a gift tax. I.R.C. § 2514;
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 15105.5 (West 1970). The possession of a general power can
result in estate tax. I.R.C. § 2041; CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 13691-13701 (West 1970).
15. See I.R.C. § 2056; CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 13805 (West Supp. 1977). The
marital deduction results in a deduction of up to 50% of the gross estate for all qualified
interests passing to a surviving spouse. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976 this has been
liberalized to a minimum of $250,000. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
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example, a husband's will might provide for several specific
bequests of the income from property to each of his children,
with the remainder to his wife. As a result of these bequests,
the wife receives less under the will than she is eligible for as a
martial deduction. If her children disclaimed part of their in-
come interests, the property would pass directly to their
mother, increasing the marital deduction and saving estate
taxes on the husband's estate." Conversely, if the wife receives
more under a will than the amount which qualifies for the
deduction and she does not need the additional interest, she
may, by means of a disclaimer, be able to save taxes on her
estate. For example, if she had received the previously men-
tioned income interest and one of her children the remainder,
she could disclaim the interest, allowing it to go directly to the
child without having the interest pass through her estate. 7
Similarly, if a marital deduction trust was created to qual-
ify for the estate tax marital deduction, disclaimers can play a
key role if the trust is defective and does not qualify.' In this
event, if the trustee disclaims all his powers with respect to the
trust property and the beneficiary disclaims an interest in it,
the trust property would probably pass into the residue of the
husband's estate and thus to the wife where it could qualify for
the marital deduction. The defect would thereby be avoided.' 9
455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1520 (amending I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)). In California, a com-
munity property state, the marital deduction only applies to separate property; thus
it is of more limited value. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2)(B).
When utilizing the marital deduction, it should be noted that the amount de-
ducted will in theory be taxed in the surviving spouse's estate. Thus, the optimum
deduction may not be the maximum deduction possible. Several factors should go into
determining the optimum deduction, among which are the surviving spouse's age and
the size of the potential estate. The wise use of disclaimers can result in the optimum
deduction at the first spouse's death. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2056(d)(2),
68A Stat. 392 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 2045, 2518).
16. This provision required that the person disclaim before the date prescribed
for filing the estate tax return in order to be effective.
17. See id. § 2056(d)(1).
18. Frequently this type of trust is used for the surviving spouse's share of the
estate. However, it must be carefully drafted in order to qualify as a qualified interest
for the marital deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056(b).
19. A potential problem in this area was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Prior to the Act it was common to have "A-B trusts" where the widow would disclaim
anything which did not qualify for the marital deduction which would then go into the
B trust giving her an income interest with a remainder to the children. There was a
question whether this disclaimer would be disqualified under I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4),
which required that the interest pass to a person other than the person making the
disclaimer. As a result, the proposed (as of May 11, 1977) Technical Corrections Bill
of 1977 (H.R. 6715) would amend § 2518(b)(4) to read "as a result of such refusal, the
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The charitable deduction. The estate tax charitable de-
duction can also be increased by disclaiming an interest which
then passes to a qualifying charity.2" For example, if the testa-
tor's will directed that the income from certain property be
paid to A for life, with the remainder to a recognized charity,
this would not ordinarily qualify for the estate tax charitable
deduction.2' However, if A disclaimed his interest, it would
pass directly to the charity, thereby qualifying for the charita-
ble deduction and reducing the amount of estate tax paid by
the testator's estate.22 These estate tax savings would make
more money available for the other beneficiaries of the estate. 3
General power of appointment. As a general rule, a dece-
dent's gross estate includes the value of all property over which
he held a general power of appointment.2 ' Thus, if a trust cre-
ated by S provided that the income be paid to A for life, with
a power in A to appoint the remainder by will and A died, the
entire value of the property would be includable in A's estate.
However, it is now possible to disclaim a general power of ap-
pointment over property and yet retain another interest in it,
without having the entire value of the property included in the
disclaimant's estate. 21 Consequently, A's disclaimer of the gen-
eral power of appointment over the above trust property, would
result in considerable estate tax savings.
Generation-skipping transfers. Under the new generation-
skipping transfer taxes,2 the creation of life estates with re-
interest passes without any direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer
and passes either -
(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or
(B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer." (emphasis added)
The'Explanation of H.R. 6715, prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation in § 29,
states
"that, where a surviving spouse refuses to accept an interest in property,
the disclaimer will be valid although the surviving spouse receives an
income interest with respect to the property if the income interest does
not result from any direction by the surviving spouse and the disclaimer
is otherwise qualified."
The suggested amendment seems broader than the explanation and it is unclear what
the effect would be if the spouse also has the right to invade the principal.
20. I.R.C. § 2055(a); CAL. Rlv. & TAx. CODE § 13841-13842 (West 1970).
21. I.R.C. § 2055(e).
22. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c) (1960).
23. If the will specifies that a disclaimed interest or possibly the residue will go
to a qualified charity, that interest will not be subject to estate tax. The saved estate
taxes will go to the beneficiaries of the estate instead of the government.
24. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
25. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958).
26. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622 (applies to transfers occurring after Apr. 20, 1976).
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mainder interests for members of subsequent generations may
no longer skip exposure to estate taxes at the death of the life
tenant(s).2 ' As a result, such interests should also be examined
for potential tax savings through the use of disclaimers. Before
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the decedent in his will could
transfer property to A for life, then to B for life, with remainder
to C.21 In this event, estate tax is paid at the decedent's death,
but is avoided at each of the other levels. Now the transfers
from A to B and B to C are taxable events, and the tax will be
computed as if they had transferred the interest." A and B
could avoid the imposition of this tax by disclaiming their in-
terests in the arrangement. 0
Income Tax
There are also potential income tax savings possible
through the effective use of disclaimers. By disclaiming an in-
come producing interest in favor of someone in a lower income
tax bracket, there will be an income tax savings. Thus, a trans-
fer could provide that the income from a trust be paid to John
but in the event that he disclaims it, to Mary. If John is in the
60% income tax bracket and Mary is only in the 20% bracket
and the interest produces $10,000 income per year, Mary will
get to keep $4000 more than John would. Similarly, if an indi-
vidual has a power which he alone can exercise to vest the
corpus or income of a trust in himself, he is treated as the owner
of the trust for income tax purposes3' and must pay income tax
on the income from the trust. However, this does not apply if
he disclaims the power within a reasonable time after becoming
aware of its existence.2
Inheritance Tax
In general, the California inheritance tax parallels the fed-
27. See I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622.
28. The only limitation on this scheme was the rule against perpetuities.
29. See I.R.C. §§ 2611-2613.
30. See id. § 2614(e).
31. Id. § 678.
32. Id. § 678(d). This time test appears to be different from the one for the estate
and gift tax provisions under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which now specifies nine
months after the creation of the interest without any reference to the knowledge of the
existence of the transfer. Since these are separate provisions of the Code they do not
serve as precedent for each other and the time test for § 678(d) may be different from
the estate and gift tax provisions.
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eral estate tax law.3" One potentially important exception
where disclaimers might be helpful is in the area of will con-
tests. 4 Under federal estate tax law, the tax is based on where
the money actually goes5.3 However, under California law the
inheritance tax is based on the terms of the will admitted to
probate .3 Thus, the terms of a compromise settlement of a will
contest might include the requirement of a disclaimer to help
minimize the tax consequences.37 For example, the will leaves
$X to A and the residue to the Hope charity and Hope contests
the will. If a compromise is worked out so that A receives $Y,
there will still be a state inheritance tax based on $X. However,
if A disclaims $Y, the federal estate tax on $Y will be saved.
There are a number of other areas where disclaimers are
potentially useful but they are less settled. These include the
possibility of disclaiming interests in joint tenancies, life insur-
ance policies or trustee powers.3 1 In attempting to disclaim
these interests, the taxpayer runs the risk that the disclaimer
may not be upheld by a court or recognized by the state or
federal taxing authorities.
In order to be effective, any attempted disclaimer must
meet the requirements of the prevailing law. Meeting these
requirements can generate many problems for the unwary
planner. To help avoid these problems, it is important to un-
derstand the federal law as it existed before the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.
DISCLAIMERS UNDER FEDERAL LAW PRIOR TO 1977
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, disclaimers were men-
tioned, but not defined, in five sections of the Internal Revenue
Code 39 and their accompanying regulations." The most com-
33. California has recently (September, 1977) passed new inheritance tax provi-
sions, some of which no longer track the federal law.
34. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA INHERITANCE TAX PRACTICE §
5.7 (1973); id. § 8.13 (Supp. 1975); Tucker, If a Will is Contested . 50 CAL. ST. B.
J. 382 (1975).
35. Tucker, supra note 34, at 412.
36. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA INHERITANCE TAX PRACTICE, §
5.7 (1973); id. § 8.13 (Supp. 1975).
37. Tucker, supra note 34, at 412.
38. See Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 588-89.
39. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2056(d)(2), 68A Stat. 392 (current version
at I.R.C. §§ 2045, 2518); I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2055(a), 2514(b) (originally enacted as
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(b)(4), 90 Stat. 1520); I.R.C. §
678(d).
40. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(d)-l(a) (1958), 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958), 20.2055-2(c)(1)
19781
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plete set of requirements for an effective disclaimer were
spelled out in Regulation 25 .2 511-1(c).4 It set out three essen-
tial elements. First, the disclaimer had to be unequivocal and
executed before the property was accepted.2 Second, it had to
be in compliance with local law.43 Finally, it had to be "made
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the
transfer.'"4
Reasonable Time
Of these requirements, the final one was the greatest
source of uncertainty. It was litigated in Keinath v.Commissioner, a case which highlights many of the difficulties
encountered in using disclaimers." The case involved a disclai-
mant who had a vested remainder in one-half of a trust, subject
to divestment if he predeceased the life of tenant. He dis-
claimed this interest six months after the death of the life
tenant, but nineteen years after the creation of the remainder.
A state court determined that the disclaimer was effective
under local law," but both the court of appeals and the tax
court held that this determination was only a necessary not a
sufficient condition for federal tax relief. 7 The treasury regula-
tion48 was held to call for a two part test-that the disclaimer
be valid under local law and be made within a reasonable time
after the disclaimant learned of the transfer.4" Based on this
test, the tax court found the disclaimer invalid for federal tax
purposes, concluding that the remainder was vested from the
time of the creation of the trust and 19 years was not a reasona-
ble time period for disclaiming."0
The Eighth Circuit reversed.5 It confronted two issues:
what was the length of a reasonable time period for a disclaimer
and when did that time period begin to run. The court con-
cluded that six months was a reasonable time period but nine-
(1958), 2 5 .2 514-3(c)(5) (1968), 1.678(d)-i (1956), 2 5.2511-1(c) (1973).




45. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
46. Id. at 60.
47. 480 F.2d at 61.
48. Treas. Reg. § 2 5.2511-1(c) (1972).
49. 58 T.C. at 359.
50. Id. at 358-59.
51. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
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teen years was not. 2 However, in contrast to the tax court, the
court of appeals found that the time period did not begin to run
until the remainder was no longer subject to divestment, which
in this case occurred at the death of the life tenant. 3 It is worth
noting that the court seemed to suggest a third possible ap-
proach to answering the question of when the reasonable time
period for disclaiming began:
Central to this case is the interpretation or denotation of
the word "transfer" in the regulation. Is the transfer made
at the time the trust is established or when the remainder-
man comes into possession and control? In other words, is
the reasonable time period calculated from the date the
remainderman has the right of possession or control of the
property or when the trust is established?54
This language implies that perhaps the time of possession as
opposed to the time of creation of the interest or the time of
absolute vesting should begin the reasonable time period for
disclaiming. In the wake of Keinath, considerable confusion
still remains as to the point at which the time period for dis-
claiming begins to run.
Insurance Proceeds
In addition to the requirements for an effective disclaimer,
another problem area under the federal law was whether insur-
ance proceeds could be disclaimed.5 One commentator sug-
gests that this should be possible if the insured reserved the
right to change the beneficiary. He draws support for this
conclusion from an example found in the marital deduction
section of the regulations which provides: "For example, if pro-
ceeds of insurance are payable to the surviving spouse and she
refuses them so that they consequently pass to an alternate
beneficiary designated by the decedent, the proceeds are con-
sidered as having passed from the decedent to the alternate
beneficiary."" Presumably, however, the disclaimer would also
52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. at 61.
55. See Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 588; Newman, supra note 1, at
73.503.1.
56. Id.
57. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-l(a) (1958). The. interest of a beneficiary in an
insurance contract where the insured reserved the right to change the beneficiary has
been considered analogous to that of a legatee under a will since it is only an expect-
ancy until the death of the insured. See Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 588.
19781
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
have to be effective under local law and there is no clear com-
mon law right to disclaim an interest in insurance proceeds. A
few jurisdictions have by statute included life insurance bene-
fits as disclaimable interests but California is not one of them.58
Joint Tenancy
Similar uncertainty surrounds the issue of whether a sur-
viving joint tenant" can disclaim property acquired by survi-
vorship. 6° It has been argued that there should be a right todisclaim on the theory that acceptance is required before a
deed of property is effective. However, under this theory, such
a disclaimer would have to be made at the initial conveyance
of the property in joint tenancy. This is so because the survivor,
in a validly created joint tenancy, does not take from the de-
ceased co-owner but by operation of law.6' Nevertheless, courts
have generally denied any form of joint tenancy disclaimer"2
unless the survivor first learned of the interest after the death
of the creator of the interest or unless there is statutory author-
ity for it.3
Even with the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, theprior law on disclaimers remains important. First, the require-
ments for an effective disclaimer outlined above still apply to
pre-1977 transfers.64 Second, the new law makes no provision
for what types of interests can be disclaimed. Thus, the prob-
lems surrounding the ability to disclaim insurance proceeds or
property conveyed in joint tenancy still persist. In any event,
pre-1977 law will presumably control all the issues left open by
the new Act.
As noted earlier, state statutes have always played an im-
portant role in determining the effectiveness of a disclaimer. In
particular, they governed what types of property interests
58. See Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 588 & n.69. The states that haveincluded life insurance benefits by statute are Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, and Ne-
braska.
59. A joint tenancy is an estate arising by a purchase or grant to two or morepersons. The major incidence in joint tenancy is the right of survivorship by which the
entire tenancy on the death of any tenant remains to the survivors and finally to the
last survivor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1634 (4th ed. 1968).
60. See Finnell, Disclaimers and the Marital Deduction: A Need for AdequateState Legislation, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 34 (1968); Newman, supra note 5, at 589.
61. Finnell, supra note 60, at 34-37; Newman, supra note 1, at 73.503.1.
62. See, e.g., Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd,
439 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971).
63. See, e.g., Hershey v. Bowers, 7 Ohio St. 2d 4, 218 N.E.2d 455 (1966).
64. See text accompanying notes 39-54, supra.
[Vol. 18
DISCLAIMERS
might be disclaimed. As a result, any comprehensive estate
plan which seeks to utilize disclaimers must take into account
the demands of local law. This aspect of disclaimer law will be
examined, using California law as a backdrop.
DISCLAIMERS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
In 1972 the California legislature codified the law on dis-
claimers in California Probate Code section 190.65 Under sec-
tion 190, a wide range of interests are disclaimable, including
whole or fractional parts of any property-real, personal, legal
or equitable.6 One can disclaim any power to appoint, con-
sume, apply or extend property or any other right, power, privi-
lege or immunity relating to property. 7 Potential disclaimants
include those who take an interest by intestate succession, de-
vise, legacy or bequest, succession to a disclaimed interest, an
election to take against a will, as beneficiary of a trust, pur-
suant to a power of appointment or an inter vivos gift. 6 There
is also a section for the survival of a disclaimer in the event that
a beneficiary under a will dies before receiving an interest. 9
This provision will prevent the interest from being taxed in
both estates.70
Disclaimed Interests
Unless otherwise specifically provided in the creating in-
strument, the disclaimed interest is treated as a lapsed inter-
est-as if the disclaimant had predeceased the person creating
the interest.7 Under the California anti-lapse statute, a lapsed
testamentary disposition fails unless a substitute is mentioned
65. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1977).
Many of the § 190 provisions are patterned after the Model Acts to Provide for
Disclaimer of Succession to Real and Personal Property for Testamentary Instruments
and Nontestamentary Instruments. For a copy of the model act and commentary on
its provisions, see 4 REAL. PROP. PROB. & Tsi. J. 658 (1969).
66. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 190(b) (West Supp. 1977).
67. See id.
According to one commentator the only inconsistency between the new probate
code section and prior case law was the right of an intestate heir to disclaim. See
Selected 1972 California Legislation, 4 PAC. L.J. 246, 248 (1973).
68. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 190(a) (West Supp. 1977).
69. See id. § 190.2.
70. The right to do this for federal tax purposes was litigated in Estate of Hoenig,
66 T.C. 471 (1976). The husband died 11 days after his wife who had willed her estate
to him. By having the husband's estate disclaim the interest left to him by the wife,
it passed directly to the daughter and saved over $100,000 in taxes.
71. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1977).
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in the instrument or the estate is left to any kindred of the
testator with surviving lineal descendants. In either case it
appears that they should take the disclaimed interest.72 If thegift fails, it falls into the residue.73 If there is no residuary clause
or it is a non-class residuary gift which is disclaimed, the giftpasses by intestate succession.74 Thus, these sections appear todetermine the eventual taker of the disclaimed interest. Since
the identity of the eventual taker is critical to the decision
whether or not to disclaim an interest, it would seem that in-
struments should be carefully drafted to specify what should
happen in the event of a disclaimer."5
Reasonable Time
The Probate Code deals with the reasonable time problemby establishing a presumption as to what is reasonable.7" Adisclaimer is conclusively presumed to have been filed within
a reasonable time if it is filed within nine months of the death
of the creator of the interest by will7" or of the person dyingintestate,"' within nine months after the interest created by aninter vivos trust becomes indefeasibly vested,79 and in all other
cases, within nine months after the first knowledge of the inter-
est is obtained by the disclaimant10
In 1976, the legislature amended section 190, adding thatthe presumption of filing within a reasonable time is also metif the disclaimer is filed "within nine months after the interest
becomes indefeasibly vested." Apparently then, the Californialegislature has adopted the reasonable time standard utilized
by the appellate court in Keinath.I
If the requirements for this presumption are not met under
any of the various statutory tests, the disclaimant has the bur-den of establishing that the disclaimer was filed within a rea-
sonable time after he acquired knowledge of the interest."s
72. Id. § 92 (West 1970).
73. 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 224-225, at 5735-37 (8th ed.
1974).
74. Id.
75. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING § 14.23 (1965).
76. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1977).
77. Id. § 19 0.3(a)(1).
78. Id. § 190.3(a)(2).
79. Id. § 19 0.3(a)(3).
80. Id. § 190.3(a)(4).
81. See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 860, § 1, at 2207.
82. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.3(b) (West Supp. 1977).
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Section 190 also provides that a disclaimer is conclusively
presumed not filed within a reasonable time if more than one
year has elapsed from the date of death or the date of transfer
of the inter vivos gift, whether outright or in trust, and the
interest has been acquired by a bonafide purchaser.83
The foregoing statutory framework appears to establish
the point at which the reasonable time period begins to run for
a disclaimer to be effective under local law. However, the expi-
ration of nine months from the starting point of any of the
statutory tests does not end the "reasonable time period" in-
quiry. After nine months, the statute merely shifts the burden
to the disclaimant to establish that the disclaimer was filed
within a reasonable time after he acquired knowledge of the
interest.
The fact that the nine month limit could elapse before a
person acquires any knowledge of the interest might raise prob-
lems in the area of powers of appointment." Frequently a per-
son does not know that he has a power until long after its
creation particularly in an intervivos trust. 5 The statute says
that interests resulting from the exercise or nonexercise of a
testamentary or nontestamentary power of appointment shall
,be deemed created by the donee of the power.8" However, this
stops short of the situation in which the donee himself wishes
to disclaim the power. Since a disclaimer is neither an exercise
nor a nonexercise of a power, it appears that the donee will be
bound by the nine month time period, running from the date
of the creation of the interest.
Form of Disclaimer
The statute also specifies the form for an effective dis-
claimer. It must be a signed, 7 written instrument 8 filed with
the superior court if the interest is created by death, with the
trustee if an inter vivos trust, and with the person creating the
interest in all other cases.8 9 If the interest involves real prop-
erty, the disclaimer must be acknowleged and proved and may
83. Id. § 190.3(c)(1), (2). A bona fide purchaser (BFP) is a purchaser or encum-
brancer for value.
84. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.3(b) (West Supp. 1977).
85. H. HARRIS, supra note 14, at § 170 (1971).
86. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 190.3(a)(1), 190.3(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
87. Id. § 190.1(iv).
88. Id. § 190(c).
89. Id. § 190.4.
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be certified and recorded in the same manner and with the
same effect as grants of real property.9 0
Taxation of Disclaimed Interests
Prior to the enactment of section 190, California Revenue
and Taxation Code section 1340991 provided that, in the event
of a disclaimer, the interest would be taxed as if there had been
no disclaimer. Although this was an unusual statute," it was
upheld by the courts. 3 The section was amended at the sametime that Probate Code section 190 was passed and now theinheritance tax is imposed based on the actual recipient of theinterest. 4 Since the California tax rate is based on the relation-
ship of the recipient to the decedent, this can affect the tax rate
and other possible deductions."5 However, the new section13409 only applies to disclaimed interests and does not affect
the outcome of will contests mentioned above."
Transfers Covered
The effective date of the statute provides for the dis-
claimer of interests created before the date of the statute. 7 Thisis different from the new federal law since the new federaldisclaimer statute" only applies to interests created after the
effective date of the section.
90. Id.
91. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13409 (West 1970).
92. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1354, 1360 (1969). California is cited as subscribingto the minority view that renunciation does [did] not free a person from inheritancetax on the theory that the tax accrues immediately upon the testator's death. Id.93. In re Estate of Nash, 256 Cal. App. 2d 560, 64 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1967).
94. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13409 (West Supp. 1977).95. Id. §§ 13307-13309, 13404-13406 (estate tax), 15110-15112, 15205-15207 (gifttax) (West 1970). This is not the case for federal estate and gift taxes where the
relationship has no bearing on the tax rate. See I.R.C. § 2001.
96. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
97. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.9 (West Supp. 1977) (eff. Aug. 16, 1972) provides:Any interest created prior to the effective date of this chapter which has
not been accepted, may be disclaimed on or after August 16, 1972, in the
manner provided herein; provided, however, that no interest which has
arisen prior to the effective date of this chapter in any person other thanthe beneficiary, shall be destroyed or diminished by any action of the
disclaimant taken pursuant to this chapter.
In re Estate of Cooke, 57 Cal. App. 3d 595, 602, 129 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1976),held that "person" includes the government and not just creditors and purchasers.Since the decedent in this case died before the effective date of the statute and theright to inheritance tax vests at the date of death, the tax was computed under § 13409
of the old Revenue and Taxation Code, despite the disclaimer.
98. I.R.C. § 2518 (applies only to transfers made after Dec. 31, 1976).
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Problem Areas
Although the statute on disclaimers went a long way to-
ward clarifying the law in California, there are still a number
of problem areas. First, the right to disclaim insurance pro-
ceeds and interests under joint tenancies remains unsettled
under the revised law. Several proposals which would have
specifically included such interests among those disclaimable
were not adopted.9
A second problem area surrounds the ability of a trustee
to disclaim part of his powers over a trust.100 In view of the tax
ramifications of trustee powers,'0 ' it has been suggested that
trusts should be permitted to contain clauses providing for the
partial disclaimer of any trust provisions which the trustee
considers burdensome, unnecessary or unwise. 02 Despite the
beneficial results which could flow from this type of partial
disclaimer, section 190 makes no specific mention of trustees.
Therefore, it seems that trustees will continue to be governed
by the common law rule which provides that they may disclaim
all their powers but not those covering only a portion of a
trust.03
A third problem area involves the rights of creditors when
a disclaimer is used to defeat their interests. For example, a
beneficiary, knowing that his interest will merely go to pay his
creditors, may disclaim the interest and allow it to pass to
someone else. Since the statute states that the disclaimer shall
relate back'014 for all purposes to the date of the creation of the
interest, 105 it would appear that the creditor's claim would be
defeated since this would imply that the debtor never had a
right to the interest. However, there is language in In re Estate
of Kalt' 6 which might generate a different result. The Kalt
court concluded that the fiction of "relation back" should not
99. UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS
ACT § 1; Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 588; see notes 27-32 and accompanying
text supra.
100. Johnson, supra note 10, at 27.
101. I.R.C. §§ 671-678.
102. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, DRAFTING CALIFORNIA REVOCABLE INTER
Vivos TRUSTS § 6.21 (1972).
103. 2 0. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 102.4 (3d ed. 1967).
104. The doctrine of "relation back" is simply a fiction by which an act done or
a right arising is deemed to have been done or to have accrued at an antecedent time
in order to preserve the rights as of the earlier date or otherwise to avoid injustice. 36A
WORDS AND PHRASES 407 (West*1962).
105. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1977).
106. 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940).
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be used to defeat the claims of creditors."°7 The court reached
this conclusion by comparing the right to disclaim an interest
in property to the creation of a general power of appointment.
The court then noted that the debtor in effect is forced to
exercise this power in favor of himself if he exercises it at all
and must accept the property subject to it even against his
will.10s By analogy then, the disclaimant should also be forced
to accept the property which would come to him as a benefici-
ary were it not for the disclaimer.
The conflict between the "relation back" theory and the
Kalt reasoning indicates that creditors should seek additional
protection from the potential adverse results of a disclaimer.
One possible protection for the creditor is the provision in sec-
tion 190 for a written waiver of the right to disclaim, executed
by the potential disclaimant which, when filed, is binding on
him.' A creditor could condition the entering of the obligation
on the execution of such a waiver by the debtor. Alternatively,
it is not beyond reason that a court could create a fictional
"waiver" for the protection of creditors when disclaimers are
used to generate fraudulent conveyances to defeat the interest
of the creditors.1'°
With the examination of California and pre-1977 federallaw complete, it becomes important to examine the impact of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 on the structure of disclaimer law.
As noted earlier, this basic structure mandated three require-
ments for a qualified disclaimer: it had to be unequivocal and
executed before the property was accepted; it had to comply
with local law; and it had to be made within a reasonable time
after knowledge of the existence of the transfer. 1'
DISCLAIMERS UNDER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976112 there was a great
deal of criticism of the law of disclaimers for federal tax pur-
107. Id. at 812, 108 P.2d at 403.
108. Id.
109. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1977).
110. Fraudulent conveyance is defined as a conveyance or transfer of property
the object of which is to defraud a creditor, or hinder or delay him, or to put suchproperty beyond his reach. The conveyance is made with the intent to avoid some duty
or debt due by or incumbent on the person making the transfer. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 790 (4th ed. 1968).
111. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
112. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
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poses." The major issues mentioned were the uncertainty of a
disclaimer's validity and the inequity in the area since the
effectiveness of the disclaimers depended on local law. This led
to fifty standards for an effective disclaimer under the federal
tax laws. Some states, such as California, enacted statutes to
help clarify the requirements for effectiveness under local law,
but this provided only a partial solution to the problem.
This was amply illustrated by the Keinath case, which
pointed out that effectiveness of a disclaimer under local law
was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for effectiveness
of a disclaimer for federal tax purposes."' The rationale of
Keinath clearly implies that an area exists where federal law
determines the effectiveness of disclaimers. The Tax Reform
Act of 1976 entered this area by adding sections 2518 and 2045
(cross-reference provision to section 2518) to the estate and gift
tax title of the Internal Revenue Code."'
Section 2518
Section 2518 provides that a disclaimer to qualify for fed-
eral tax purposes must satisfy four conditions. First, the refusal
to accept the interest in property must be in writing."' Second,
this refusal must be received by the transferor of the interest,
his legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the
property not later than nine months after the day on which the
transfer creating the interest is made." 7 Third, the person must
not accept the interest or any of its benefits prior to making the
disclaimer."' Finally, as a result of the refusal to accept the
property, the interest must pass to a person other than the
person making the disclaimer."9 These conditions raise the
issue of whether or not they nullify the former requirement that
a disclaimer be effective under local law. It is possible that a
113. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 & n.5 (1976), reprinted in
119761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3421 [hereinafter cited without parallel
citation as HOUSE REPORT]; Committee on Estate & Gift Taxes, Legislative Recom-
mendation No. 2, 27 TAx LAW. 481 (1974); Newman & Kalter, supra note 5, at 571;
Newman, Disclaimers of Future Interests: Continuing Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827 (1974); Newman, supra note 1, at 73.500.
114. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973); see note 47 and accompanying text supra.
115. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009, 90 Stat. 1520.
116. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1).
117. Id. § 2518(b)(2).
118. Id. § 2518(b)(3).
119. Id. § 2518(b)(4).
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disclaimer could meet the requirements of section 2518 and not
meet the requirements of the state involved.
Disclaimable Interests
For example, one of the biggest problems of the prior law
was its failure to outline what types of interests could be dis-
claimed. Section 2518 does not solve this problem, it merely
says "an interest in property" can be disclaimed. It also pro-
vides that an undivided portion of an interest can be dis-
claimed 2O and that a power with respect to property is a dis-
claimable interest. 2 ' Beyond this there is no listing of the types
of interests which are disclaimable. This raises a question re-
garding whether the interest must be disclaimable under local
law to be a disclaimable interest under federal tax law or,
whether it need only be an interest in property under local
law. '22 Since the law was supposed to help make the disclaimer
uniform throughout the United States, the latter interpretation
would be more useful. However, this could lead to the anoma-
lous result of a property interest being disclaimed for federal
tax purposes which cannot be disclaimed under local law.' 3
The promulgation of a clear treasury regulation would help
clarify this point.
120. Id. § 2518(c)(1).
121. Id. § 2518(c)(2).
122. If it merely needs to be a property interest under local law, joint tenancies
and insurance benefits might be disclaimable for federal tax purposes even though not
disclaimable under state law. See notes 55-63, 99-104 and accompanying text supra.123. A statement in the House report suggests that the federal law is intended
to operate independently of state law.
If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, a refusal to acceptproperty is to be given effect for Federal estate and gift tax purposes even
if the applicable local law does not technically characterize the refusal
as a "disclaimer" or if the person refusing the property was considered
to have been the owner of the legal title to the property before refusing
acceptance of the property.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 113, at 67. However, since the disclaimer is only effective if
the interest passes to a person other than the person making the disclaimer, I.R.C. §
2518(b)(4), it would seem that the disclaimer must be effective under state law. TheAmerican Bar Association's disclaimer proposal deals with the problem and states:
DISCLAIMERS INEFFECTIVE UNDER LOCAL LAW-A disclaimer
of property which is ineffective under governing law shall be given effect
for the purpose of this section if the property is transferred, within the
time herein prescribed for delivery of a disclaimer, to the person or per-
sons who would have been entitled thereto had the disclaimant prede-
ceased the prior holder of the property.
This statement might provide guidance for the regulations or for a technical amend-
ment. See J. MCCORD, 1976 ESTATE AND GiFT TAX REFORM 253-54 (1977).
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Execution of Disclaimers
Another area where federal and state law could conceiva-
bly conflict is in the requirements for execution of a qualified
disclaimer. Section 2518 specifies that the disclaimer must be
in writing and must be received by the transferor, his legal
representative or the holder of the legal title to the property.,
In comparison, the California statute' calls for filing with the
court if the interest is created at death, the trustee of an inter
vivos trust, or the person creating the interest in all other cases.
It is possible that the notification could be effective under one
rule but not the other. For example, the disclaimant could
notify the executor but not the court. This would imply a dis-
claimer effective under federal law but not state law. Perhaps
the easiest solution to this problem would be to change the
California statute so that it parallels the federal law.
Reasonable Time Period
As outlined earlier in Keinath,1 perhaps the most uncer-
tain aspect of the pre-1977 federal law on disclaimers was when
the reasonable time period for making a disclaimer began to
run. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the House Ways and
Means Committee wanted to establish a uniform standard of
time within which a disclaimer must be made.' Keinath was
mentioned by the committee with a tone of disapproval be-
cause of the nineteen year period from the date of death to the
date of disclaimer.2 s The Committee's solution in section 2518
was to define a reasonable time to be nine months from "the
date on which the transfer creating the interest in such person
is made."'' 9 Arguably, this does not define a workable starting
point for the reasonable time period, since it does not deal with
interests which may not vest until long after the actual creation
of the interest. For example, a revocable trust might be estab-
lished where an interest is created but may be withdrawn at
124. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1), (2).
125. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.4 (West Supp. 1977).
126. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
127. HousE REPORT, supra note 113, at 66.
128. This comment seems to ignore some of the subtleties of the Keinath deci-
sion. It concentrates on the 19 years rather than the problem of when to start the
reasonable time period. It also seems to stress the importance of local law rather than
the fact that Keinath established a federal time standard (in addition to requiring
effectiveness under local law). See notes 45-54 and accompanying text supra.
129. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
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any time. It seems unreasonable to assume that the beneficiary
in this instance should be forced to disclaim what amounts to
a mere expectancy within nine months of the establishment of
the trust.
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference attempted to clarify the section by stating that the
nine month period is to be determined in reference to each
taxable transfer. Presumably, this would be a transfer subject
to an estate, gift or generation skipping tax.'30 This standard
would cover the revocable trust since there is no liability for gift
tax until an interest vests in a beneficiary.' 3' However, it gener-
ates problems with respect to remainder interests, since this
standard makes no allowance for the point at which actual
knowledge of these interests is acquired by the beneficiary.
Even if such knowledge was not acquired until years after the
transfer, remainder interests are apparently not disclaimable
more than nine months after their creation, since this is gener-
ally a taxable event.'32
Since California has now adopted the more liberal Keinath
standard as part of its statutory reasonable time requirement,
it appears that some disclaimers, particularly of remainder in-
terests, will be valid under state law but not under the more
stringent federal standard.
Generation-skipping transfers. The Tax Reform Act of1976 may have created an exception to this with respect to
generation-skipping transfers'33 which do impose a tax when
subsequent interests vest in enjoyment.9 For example, John,
in his will, leaves a life estate to his daughter Mary, a subse-
quent life estate to his granddaughter Susie and the remainder
interest to any living great grandchildren at Susie's death.
Under the generation-skipping tax the transfers from Mary to
Susie and from Susie to the grandchildren will be subject to the
130. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607 (1976), reprinted in[19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4262 app. A [hereinafter cited without
parallel citation as HousE CONFERENCE REPORT].
131. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b),(f),(g) (1958).
132. Remainder interests created by a will are taxed with the original estate, not
at the time they vest in possession. I.R.C. § 2031.
In California, since the relationship of the recipient determines the tax rate of thedeath tax and the gift tax, there is provision for adjustment of the tax at a later date.
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 13411, 14191, 15210, 15951 (West 1970).
133. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
134. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1520(codified at I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622).
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generation-skipping tax. Thus, it would seem that Susie's in-
terest could be disclaimed at Mary's death so that the interest
would go directly to the grandchildren without being taxed as
a transfer from Susie to the grandchildren. This seems permis-
sible under the new law since "any taxable distribution or taxa-
ble termination" is defined to be a generation-skipping trans-
fer.'35 Consequently, under the Conference Committee's inter-
pretation it would seem that an interest could be disclaimed
at the termination of a prior life estate since that would be a
taxable transfer, avoiding the requirement that the interest be
disclaimed nine months after the death of its creator (John in
the example).136
However, an alternative theory is available. This would be
that the creation of the interest occurs in the will of the original
decedent and therefore, any disclaimers must be filed within
nine months of his death. There is language in the House Ways
and Means Committee report which might support this view,
since it states: "A beneficiary under a generation-skipping
trust is permitted to disclaim his interest in that trust within
the same time period and the same manner as would any bene-
ficiary of an outright gift or bequest."'37
In the wake of these interpretations, it seems obvious that
the disclaimer of generation-skipping interests will be a major
area of uncertainty under the new law, since either view could
reasonably prevail.
Powers of appointment. The Conference Committee's re-
port also provided that a recipient of a general power of ap-
pointment would have nine months to disclaim.' No mention
was made of the problem of lack of knowledge which could lead
to the difficulties discussed above. 3" As a result, these interests
could generate similar problems concerning the reasonable
time period and its starting point.
Transfers involving minors. An exception to the nine
month disclaimer period arises when a minor is the recipient
of the interest.'4 ° Such a person is given nine months after
attaining the age of twenty one. It is difficult to reconcile why
this type of incompetency receives an exception but others such
135. See I.R.C. § 2611(a).
136. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 4118, 4262 app. A.
137. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 113, at 58.
138. HoUsE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 4118, 4262 app. A.
139. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
140. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(B).
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as absence from the United States or mental incompetency do
not. Such a long delay would seem to create a great deal of
uncertainty in transfers involving minors. For example, the
federal law by its terms would arguably prohibit the guardian
of a minor from making a qualified disclaimer, despite the fact
that other types of guardians may do so. This might also cause
some conflict with state law since under California law a guard-
ian can disclaim for a minor.' If he does not, would the minor
still have the right to disclaim when he reaches age twenty-
one? If the guardian disclaims would this be effective for fed-
eral law purposes since it is effective under state law? The
answer seems to depend on the resolution of the previously
mentioned problem involving the conflict between state law
and the federal tax law.
Transfers Covered
The effective date for the new federal law provides for its
application to all transfers creating an interest in the person
disclaiming made after December 31, 1976.111 Thus, the prior
law mentioned above will still apply to all interests created
before that time. It should also be used along with the legisla-
tive history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to clarify some of
the obvious problems with the new statute.
CONCLUSION
The value of disclaimers as an estate planning tool has
long been recognized. However, the uncertainty surrounding
their use served to detract from their obvious utility. Recent
legislative efforts have endeavored to make this area of the law
more dependable.
Despite these efforts, there are still a number of problem
areas such as what types of interests can be disclaimed and
when the reasonable time period to execute a disclaimer begins
to run.'43 Indeed, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 may have created
141. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1977).
142. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(e)(2), 90 Stat. 1520.
143. The definite nine month period of the federal legislation should decrease theimportance of the California section on time, CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.3(b) (West Supp.
1977), since avoiding the federal tax is often the major aim of a disclaimer.
This might not be so true of a smaller estate, since the Tax Reform Act of 1976
increased the exemption for the estate tax. Before, any estate over $60,000 was subject
to the federal estate tax. By 1981 any estate over $175,625 will be subject to the federal
estate tax. Tax Reform Act of i976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified
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yet another difficulty. It was designed to establish a uniform
disclaimer law throughout the states. However, it is unclear
whether the previous requirement that a disclaimer be effective
under the state law still applies and what the effect will be
when there is a conflict between the state and federal dis-
claimer laws. This is a major issue which needs to be resolved.
Since the disclaimer is such a useful and indispensable
tool for proper estate planning and management, it is hoped
that regulations under the new federal tax law can be issued
to help clarify some of these areas in order to avoid costly
litigation.
Barbara Beck
at I.R.C. § 2010). Thus, saving California death taxes may become an important issue
also.

